SERIAL ENTREPRENEURS: ARE THEY BETTER?

A VIEW FROM STANFORD UNIVERSITY ALUMNI

Hervé Lebret EPFL

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Motivation

Are serial entrepreneurs a special species, are they better?

- General public and high-tech community believes so
- Some publications support it

Performance persistence in entrepreneurship[★]

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ABSTRACT

This paper presents evidence of performance persistence in entrepreneurship. We show that entrepreneurs with a track record of success are much more likely to succeed than first-time entrepreneurs and those who have previously failed. In particular, they exhibit persistence in selecting the right industry and time to start new ventures. Entrepreneurs with demonstrated market timing skill are also more likely to outperform industry peers in their subsequent ventures. This is consistent with the view that if suppliers and customers perceive the entrepreneur to have market timing skill, and is therefore more likely to succeed, they will be more willing to commit resources to the firm. In this way, success breeds success and strengthens performance persistence.

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Background

STANFORD UNIVERSITY AND HIGH-TECH ENTREPRENEURSHIP: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

Hervé Lebret EPFL

Babson College Entrepreneurship Research Conference







STANFORD UNIVERSITY AND HIGH-TECH ENTREPRENEURSHIP: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

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ABSTRACT

This study examines more than 2'700 companies founded by alumni of Stanford University or having licensed a technology from this university. Stanford University is with MIT one of the most entrepreneurial university in the world, and surprisingly not much data is available on its spin-offs and start-ups. Some important features are described such as the use of venture capital, the dynamics of growth and exits through acquisition or initial public offering. Some characteristics of the founders are also considered such as the time lag between their academic activity and the start-up creation as well as the characteristics of serial entrepreneurs.

INTRODUCTION

Academic entrepreneurship as well as the role of universities in high-tech entrepreneurship through their alumni has been a much-studied topic in the recent past. Two extensive studies (Shane, 2004 and Djokovic & Souitaris, 2008) illustrate the amount of work done recently. Many of these analyses (Shane, 2004; Roberts, 1991; Hsu et al. 2007; Roberts & Eesley, 2009) were focused on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Other authors (Saxenian, 1994; Zhang, 2003, 2009) have compared the Boston Area and Silicon Valley in particular through the angle of venture capital funding and have shown the critical role of both MIT and Stanford University in academic entrepreneurship. It would be impossible to make here a list of all papers published on the topic and Djokovic has done a very interesting compilation of papers studying spinouts from academic institutions. Another synthesis summarizing lessons learnt on universities and start-ups (Lerner, 2005) was also published after many articles on the topics related to spinoffs and venture capital.

Whereas Silicon Valley has been extensively studied (Saxenian 1994, 1999; Kenney, 2000; Lee et al., 2000), it appears that Stanford University has not been studied as much as MIT or many other universities, which have been much less entrepreneurial than Stanford. Here can be mentioned the cases of UT-Austin (Smilor, 1990), the University of Cambridge in the UK (Garnsey & Heffernan, 2005), Oxford University (Lawton Smith & Ho, 2006), ETH Zurich (Oskarsson & Schläpfer, 2008) or the broader subject of universities and venture capital (Zhang,

More background

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2007



Start-Up

Ce que nous pouvons encore apprendre de la Silicon Valley

What we may still learn from Silicon Valley

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Serial and non-serial founders





Dave Hewlett and Bill Packard









(Marc Andreessen and) Professor James Clark,





Jerry Yang and David Filo



Netscape

Professor John Hennessy









Sergey Brin and Larry Page



Rambus.

FTL (1986) Rambus (1990) Chromatic Research(1993) Epigram (1996) Matrix Semiconductor(1997)

Serial data

Founders


Nb of companies	Nb of	Nb of professor
founded	founders	founders
1	2'266	123
2	317	24
3	82	11
4	27	3
5	10	4
6	6	
8	2	1
16	1	1
Total	2'711	167
% serial	16%	26%

Companies having		
No serial founder	1'739	63.8%
1 serial founder	890	32.6%
2 serial founders	83	3.0%
3 serial founders	10	0.4%
4 serial founders	5	0.2%
Total	2'727	


Basic results

Data on non-serial	VC-backed	,	M&A	,	Public val	lue in 2009	Public value at IPO P		Public val	lue 12 m. after IPO	Ceased		
1739	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average			
	530	\$33'707'000	265	\$497'000'000	101	\$5'145'000'000	175	\$833'000'000	174	\$906'000'000	371		
Data on serial	VC-backed		M&A		Public	,	Public valu	ue at IPO	Public val	lue 12 m. after IPO			
988	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average			
	441	\$35'690'000	225	\$639'000'000	56	\$5'858'000'000	151	\$522'000'000	151	\$635'000'000	232		
1st comp	VC-backed		M&A	,	Public	,	Public valu	ue at IPO	Public val	lue 12 m. after IPO			
378	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average	1		
	149	\$23'319'000		\$865'000'000		\$9'417'000'000	68	\$480'000'000	68	\$592'000'000	83		
2nd comp	VC-backed		M&A	7	Public	,	Public value at IPO		Public value at IPO		Public val	lue 12 m. after IPO	
399	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average			
	185	\$39'589'000		\$642'000'000	21	\$4'032'000'000	56	•		-	90		
3rd comp	VC-backed		M&A	,	Public	,	Public value at IPO		Public val	lue 12 m. after IPO			
124	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average			
	59	\$51'776'000	21	\$149'000'000	6	\$2'324'000'000	13	\$1'104'000'000	13	\$1'141'000'000	39		
wo 99-00	45	\$48'717'000	19	\$82'250'000	6	\$2'324'000'000	7	\$350'000'000	7	\$370'000'000	,		
4th+ comp	VC-backed		M&A		Public	,	Public valu	ue at IPO	Public val	lue 12 m. after IPO			
87	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average			
	48	\$39'289'000	25	\$152'000'000	5	\$681'000'000	14	\$293'000'000	14	\$165'000'000	20		
2+ serial	VC-backed	1	M&A	1	Public	1	Public valu	ue at IPO	Public val	lue 12 m. after IPO			
610	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average			
	292	\$42'002'000		\$464'513'000		\$3'188'000'000	83	\$557'000'000		\$669'000'000	149		

Non-parametric analysis: VC amounts



Non-parametric analysis: M&A values



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og. 000.01.0	beta	se	t	р	DFE	Dev
Success (0/1) vs.	-1.708	0.105	-16.333	0.000	1516	1694
vc exists (0/1)	1.274	0.127	10.044	0.000 ***		
Success (0/1) vs.	-0.210	0.105	-1.997	0.046	698	932
vc size (\$M)	0.000	0.000	-2.698	0.007 ***		
Success (0/1) vs.	0.255	0.163	1.566	0.117	1522	1767
period (1-8)	-0.237	0.032	-7.471	0.000 ***		
0 (0/4)	= 0.400	44.470	5 044	0.000	4500	4776
Success (0/1) vs.	78.132	11.472	6.811	0.000	1522	1776
Year of foundation	-0.040	0.006	-6.889	0.000 ***		
Success (0/1) vs.	0.000	0.177	0.002	0.999	1499	1563
vc exists (0/1)	1.805	0.150	12.003	0.000 ***	1.33	1303
period (1-8)	-0.412	0.039	-10.623	0.000 ***		
μοσω (= σ)	V	0.000	20.020	0.000		
Success (0/1) vs.	1.698	0.337	5.036	0.000	697	895
vc size (\$M)	0.000	0.000	-1.682	0.093 *		
period (1-8)	-0.359	0.060	-5.958	0.000 ***		
Success (0/1) vs.	-0.909	0.066	-13.757	0.000	1538	1835
Serial (0/1)	-0.073	0.128	-0.568	0.570		
C (0/1)	0.016	0.470	0.000	0.020	1.400	4562
Success (0/1) vs.	0.016 1.807	0.179 0.151	0.089 12.010	0.929 0.000 ***	1498	1563
vc exists (0/1) period (1-8)			-10.566	0.000 ***		
· · · ·	- 0.410 -0.091	0.039 0.140	-0.650	0.516		
Serial (0/1)	-0.091	0.140	-0.050	0.510		
Success (0/1) vs.	1.661	0.339	4.901	0.000	696	894
vc size (\$M)	0.000	0.000	-1.749	0.080 *		
period (1-8)	-0.360	0.060	-5.980	0.000 ***		
Serial (0/1)	0.158	0.173	0.917	0.359		
	•					

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One-to-one comparison

Student tests	N	Mean	99% con	f. interval	t-value	p-value	Table
Quality from 1st to 2nd	291	2.9	2.7	3.1	36.2	<0.01%	4
VC amount from 1st to 2nd	223	3.8	3.6	4.1	37.8	<0.01%	4
Quality from 1st to 2nd and 2nd to 3rd	351	2.9	2.7	3.1	39.9	<0.01%	4
VC amount 1st to 2nd and 2nd to 3rd	267	3.8	3.6	4.1	42.7	<0.01%	4
Quality when no VC in common	90	2.8	2.4	3.2	19.6	<0.01%	5
Quality when one VC in common	64	3.5	3.0	3.9	19.4	<0.01%	5
Quality if founder out after exit	159	2.7	2.4	3.0	25.1	<0.01%	5
Quality if founder out before exit	133	2.8	2.5	3.1	25.5	<0.01%	5

Quality measure:

5: much better

4: better

3: equivalent

2: worse

1: much worse

Value of new (all data) success when prior is known

Prior	N	Mean New	90% conf	. interval
1	71	2.15	1.88	2.43
2	42	2.35	1.91	2.80
3	102	2.41	2.18	2.64
4	24	2.66	2.10	3.22
5	133	2.91	2.68	3.14

Value of new (VC-backed) success when prior is known

Prior	N	Mean New	90% conf.	interval
1	32	2.71	2.27	3.16
2	26	2.73	2.12	3.34
3	42	2.85	2.42	3.28
4	15	3.26	2.54	3.98
5	99	3.07	2.80	3.33

More logistic regressions (prior success)

		beta	se	t	р	DFE	Dev		
Success	(0/1) vs.	-1.917	0.313	-6.134	0.000	370	427		
Priorsuc	(1/5)	0.283	0.081	3.491	0.001 ***				
Success	(0/1) vs.	-2.950	0.398	-7.408	0.000	361	373		
riorsuc	(1/5)	0.220	0.087	2.536	0.011 **				
c exists	(0/1)	1.733	0.318	5.453	0.000 ***				
uccess	(0/1) vs.	-1.107	0.523	-2.118	0.034	357	349		
Priorsuc	(1/5)	0.261	0.092	2.836	0.005 ***				
c exists	(0/1)	2.291	0.372	6.163	0.000 ***		0.4		'(F '1 \
eriod		-0.453	0.097	-4.649	0.000 ***		Crite	ria	if Exit/VC > 5 with exit > 5 if Exit/VC > 2 else
	beta	-2.1151	-2	2.3813	-2.2	-1.13	3		if Exit / VC <1
	se	0.286	(0.2897	0.301	0.18	3		if Exit near zero
	t	-7.3966	-8	3.2202	-7.31	-6.29)		No info
	р	0		0	0	C)		
Vcexists	s beta	1.819 ***	k	1.75 ***	1.76 ***				
	se	0.3152	(0.3191	0.321				
	t	5.7709	į	5.4841	5.489				
	р	0		0	0				
prior1	beta	-0.909 **			-0.78 *	-0.46	5		
	se	0.3955			0.418	0.364	1		
	t	-2.2981			-1.87	-1.27	7		
	р	0.0216			0.061	0.204	<u> </u>		
prior5	beta		(0.4517 *	0.258	0.656	***		
	se			0.257	0.273	0.253	3		
	t			1.758	0.943	2.591	L		
	р		(0.0787	0.346	0.01	<u> </u>		
	DFE	361		361	360	369)		
	Dev	374		377	373	428			
		<u>.</u>		-	0.0		-		


NR


Comments and future work

- Difficult to claim that serial entrepreneurs are any better, certainly not after 3rd venture
- If experience matters, motivation and external components are at play (team, product, market)
- However they do attract more VC money
- It is a work in progress!

	Work done	Work in progress
Companies	2′727	5′669
Founders	2′711	6′810
Serial founders	445	1′066

Backup slides






Quantitative success measure - prior success impact

Previous value (\$M)								
Entrepreneur	0-10	10-100	100-1000	>1000	All			
New Value 0-10	47	12	25	10	94			
(\$M) 10-100	9	4	18	1	32			
100-1000	12	12	18	16	58			
>1000	4	8	7		19			
Total	72	36	68	27	203			
% previous	35%	18%	33%	13%				
Median (\$M)	0	115	25	179				
Mean (\$M)	638	862	816	304				
%	0-10	10-100	100-1000	>1000	All			
0-10	65%	33%	37%	37%	46%			
10-100	13%	11%	26%	4%	16%			
100-1000	17%	33%	26%	59%	29%			
>1000	6%	22%	10%	0%	9%			

Quantitative success measure - prior success impact

Previous value (\$M)								
Start-ups	0-10	10-100	100-1000	>1000	All			
New Value 0-10	33	10	26	10	79			
(\$M) 10-100	5	3	18	2	28			
100-1000	8	8	24	13	53			
>1000	4	4	8		16			
Total	50	25	76	25	176			
% previous	28%	14%	43%	14%				
Median (\$M)	0	55	45	166				
Mean (\$M)	398	465	832	209				
%	0-10	10-100	100-1000	>1000	All			
0-10	66%	40%	34%	40%	45%			
10-100	10%	12%	24%	8%	16%			
100-1000	16%	32%	32%	52%	30%			
>1000	8%	16%	11%	0%	9%			

Qualitative success measure – All comps vs. VC impact



Criteria	if Exit/VC > 5 with exit > 50	5
	if Exit/VC > 2	4
	else	3
	if Exit / VC <1	2
	if Exit near zero	1
	No info	NR

Qualitative success measure - prior success impact

1	Impact of initia	al success						
_	if prior was	1	2	3	4	5	NR ⁻	Total
then new is	1	35	21	40	9	37	19	161
	2	10	8	13	4	26	8	69
	3	15	1	30	1	19	12	78
	4	2	1	5	6	13	6	33
	5	9	11	14	4	38	6	82
	NR	28	11	29	12	42	65	187
	Total	99	53	131	36	175	116	610
	%	16%	9%	21%	6%	29%	19%	
Impact of in	itial success							
_	if prior was	1	2	3	4	5	NR ⁻	Total
then new is	1	35%	40%	31%	25%	21%	16%	26%
	2	10%	15%	10%	11%	15%	7%	11%
	3	15%	2%	23%	3%	11%	10%	13%
	4	2%	2%	4%	17%	7%	5%	5%
	5	9%	21%	11%	11%	22%	5%	13%
	NR	28%	21%	22%	33%	24%	56%	31%
Criteria	if Exit/VC	C > 5 with exit > 5	50	5				
	if Exit/VC			4				
	else			3				
	if Exit / V			2				
	if Exit ne No info	ar zero		1 NR				
	140 11110			1 41 3				

Qualitative success measure - prior success impact and VCs

In	npact of initia	al success						
VC-backed _i	f prior was	1	2	3	4	5	NR Tot	al
then new is	1	9	11	13	3	22	4	62
	2	6	4	8	3	24	4	49
	3	9	1	6		10	3	29
	4	1	1	2	5	11	5	25
	5	7	9	13	4	32	6	71
	NR	5	2	13	3	26	10	59
	Total	37	28	55	18	125	32	295
	%	13%	9%	19%	6%	42%	11%	
In	npact of initia	al success						
<u>i</u> 1	f prior was	1	2	3	4	5	NR Tot	al
then new is	1	24%	39%	24%	17%	18%	13%	21%
	2	16%	14%	15%	17%	19%	13%	17%
	3	24%	4%	11%	0%	8%	9%	10%
	4	3%	4%	4%	28%	9%	16%	8%
	5	19%	32%	24%	22%	26%	19%	24%
	NR	14%	7%	24%	17%	21%	31%	20%
Criteria	if Exit/VC	3 > 5 with exit > 50		5				
	if Exit/VC	5 > 2		4				
	else if Exit / V	C -1		3 2				
	if Exit nea			1				
	No info	- -		NR				

Qualitative success measure - common VC impact

	Total	1	2	3	4	5	NR
Serial w. no common VC	230	56	36	23	21	49	45
		30%	19%	12%	11%	26%	
		24%	16%	10%	9%	21%	20%
Prior success	230	32	24	54	14	78	28
		16%	12%	27%	7%	39%	
		14%	10%	23%	6%	34%	12%
	T ()	4	ما	اء	4	_	NID
	Total	1	2	3	4	5	NR_
Serial w. common VC	65	6	13	6	4	22	14
		12%	25%	12%	8%	43%	
		9%	20%	9%	6%	34%	22%
Prior success	65	5	4	1	4	47	4
		8%	7%	2%	7%	77%	
		8%	6%	2%	6%	72%	6%

Criteria	if Exit/VC > 5 with exit > 50	5
	if Exit/VC > 2	4
	else	3
	if Exit / VC <1	2
	if Exit near zero	1
	No info	NR

More logistic regressions (serials with same VC)

	beta	se	t	р		DFE	Dev
	-0.5051	0.1513	-3.3373	0.0008			_
SameVC	0.5443	0.3184	1.7096	0.0873	*		
	-0.4514	0.0853	-5.2905	0			
Ser (0/1)	-0.0646	0.1733	-0.3728	0.7093			
SameVC	0.5539	0.3169	1.748	0.0805	*	811	1087
	-0.4206	0.2266	-1.8557	0.0635			
Prior1	-0.7747	0.4683	-1.6543	0.0981	*	209	279
Prior5	-0.0816	0.3207	-0.2545	0.7991			
SameVC	0.5564	0.3466	1.6055	0.1084			
	-1.0278	0.3739	-2.749	0.006			
Priorsuc	0.4492	0.3379	1.3293	0.1837		210	280
SameVC	0.1356	0.0976	1.3891	0.1648			

Criteria if Exit/VC > 5 with exit > 50 5 if Exit/VC > 2 4 else 3 if Exit / VC <1 2 if Exit near zero 1 No info NR

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And fields of activities?

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Field	'Biotech'	'Medtech'	'Electronics'	'Consumer'	'Finance'	'Healthcare'	'Internet'	'NA'	'Non tech services	' 'OtherTech'	'Software'	'Tech Services'	'Telecom/IT'
N=	160	140	436	145	219	36	362	76	310	104	341	121	277
Interc	-0.9931 0.0000	-0.9767 0.0000	-1.0327 0.0000	-0.9299 0.0000	-0.9050 0.0000	-0.9357 0.0000	-0.8906 0.0000	-0.9052 0.0000	-0.8607 0.0000	-0.9158 0.0000	-0.8833 0.0000	-0.9093 0.0000	-0.9093 0.0000
Field	0.7779 0.0001	0.7642 0.0007	0.4574 0.0006	0.0291 0.9305	-0.8442 0.0293	0.4502 0.3203	-0.2333 0.1336	-101.6608 1.0000	- 2.4227 0.0000	-0.4979 0.1855	-0.3207 0.0543	-0.8084 0.051	-0.8084 0.0511
	***	***	***		**				***		*	*	*
Interc	-1.7288 0.0000	-1.7260 0.0000	-1.7932 0.0000	-1.7404 0.0000	-1.6948 0.0000	-1.7145 0.0000	-1.6598 0.0000	-1.6740 0.0000	-1.5937 0.0000	-1.7179 0.0000	-1.6586 0.0000	-1.6979 0.0000	-1.7118 0.0000
Field	0.5557 0.0087	0.5306 0.0232	0.4116 0.0032	0.5336 0.1276	-0.1879 0.6545	0.3954 0.4233	-0.4378 0.0067	-101.2683 1.0000	- 1.7379 0.0036	0.1553 0.6900	-0.3977 0.0219	-0.1908 0.6555	0.0412 0.8085
Vcexists	1.2359 0.0000	1.2479 0.0000	1.2617 0.0000	1.3000 0.0000	1.2606 0.0000	1.2753 0.0000	1.3162 0.0000	1.2520 0.0000	1.1625 0.0000	1.2829 0.0000	1.2862 0.0000	1.2649 0.0000	1.2707 0.0000
	***	**	**				***		***		**		
DFE	1510	1510	1510	1510	1510	1510	1510	1510	1510	1510	1510	1510	1510
Dev	1687	1689	1685	1692	1694	1693	1686	1681	1680	1694	1688	1694	1694

	beta	se	1	t p)	DFE	Dev		beta	se	1	t į	p	DFE	Dev
	-1.6010	0.2182	-7.3366	0.0000		1507	1650		-1.8635	0.2847	-6.5447	0.0000		1506	1648
Vcexists	1.0899	0.1410	7.7284	0.0000	***			VC exists	1.0938	0.1413	7.7393	0.0000	***		
Biotech'	0.5498	0.3019	1.8210	0.0686	*			Biotech	0.8090	0.3516	2.3010	0.0214	**		
'Medtech'	0.5344	0.3170	1.6856	0.0919	*			Medtech	0.7938	0.3647	2.1763	0.0295	**		
'Electronics'	0.3367	0.2508	1.3427	0.1794				Electronics	0.5966	0.3091	1.9301	0.0536	*		
'Finance'	-0.2817	0.4607	-0.6115	0.5408				Consumer	0.7100	0.4386	1.6186	0.1055			
'Internet'	-0.3151	0.2673	-1.1791	0.2384				Finance	-0.0192	0.4957	-0.0388	0.9691			
'Non tech services'	-1.7260	0.6274	-2.7509	0.0059	***			Internet	-0.0557	0.3224	-0.1727	0.8629			
'Software'	-0.3123	0.2731	-1.1435	0.2528			1	Non tech services	-1.4638	0.6535	-2.2399	0.0251	**		
'Tech Services'	-0.2539	0.4685	-0.5418	0.5879				Software	-0.0525	0.3274	-0.1605	0.8725			
'Telecom/IT'	0.0730	0.2726	0.2678	0.7889				Tech Services	0.0079	0.5028	0.0158	0.9874			
·								Telecom/IT	0.3325	0.3269	1.0171	0.3091			